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Looking Back on "The Sulu Zone": State Formation, 
Slave Raiding and Ethnic Diversity in Southeast Asia 
by James Francis Warren 
Introduction 
M y initial encounter with the Sulu Zone, located between the Asian mainland and the large islands of Mindanao, Borneo and Sulawesi, began twenty-eight years ago.! I first learned of the Sulu Archipelago and the maritime world of 
the Samal Bajau Laut when I received my Peace Corps posting in 1967, assigning me to 
Semporna, Sabah, on the east coast of Borneo. I lived for two years in Semporna (1967-
69). The period from January to November, 1969, spent in Kampong Bangau2, a Samal 
Bajau Laut village comprising a flotilla of boat dwellers and a semi-sedentary population 
of Bajau Laut in varying stages of adaptation to a house dwelling way of life, was 
particularly memorable. It was the rapid abandonment of sea nomadism, a life-style 
which has characterised the Samal Bajau Laut as a people and from which they drew 
their sense of identity and purpose, that first motivated my interest in Southeast Asian 
History. The search for historical antecedents to contemporary social change among the 
Samal Bajau Laut, whose maritime nomadic culture was being inexorably extinguished 
by political and economic development, involved me in a study of the interaction 
between a relatively weak quasi-colonial agency, The North Borneo Chartered 
Company, and the maritime nomadic people of the northeast coast of Borneo between 
1878 and 1909. Much of the research was performed during vacation periods while I 
served in Sabah as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Despite its limitations in wealth and power, 
the Chartered Company's administration presided over the emergence of a new social 
and political order at the beginning of the twentieth century. This transformation 
affected the Taosug of the Sulu Sultanate, the overlords of the coast in earlier periods; 
the Chinese, most of whom came to Semporna as a result of Chartered Company rule; 
and had an even more profound impact on the Samal Bajau Laut.2 
My experience of attempting to my write my Master's thesis in 1970 on the Samal 
Bajau Laut under Chartered Company rule, a history involving a non-western 
marginalised people based primarily on written (British) records, highlighted the extreme 
difficulty of presenting a balanced interpretation, using only traditional historiographical 
methods. It impressed upon me the vital importance of oral traditions and an 
ethnohistorical methodology in any future effort to investigate historical changes in 
values, social organisation and political patterns of the maritime people of Southeast 
This paper was initially presented to the National Conference of the Japan Society for Southeast Asian 
History in June 1993. A revised version was delivered to the New Zealand Asian Studies Association 
Conference in July 1995. 
2 See James Francis Warren, The North Borneo Chartered Company's Administration of the Bajau, I878-
I909 (Athens: Southeast Asia Series, No. 22, Ohio University Press, 1971). On the radical nature of change 
experienced by the Samal Bajau Laut see Carol Warren, Ideology, Identity and Change: The Experience of 
the Bajau Land of East Malaysia, I969-I975 (Townsville: Southeast Asia Series, No. 14, James Cook 
University, 1983). 
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Asia.3 There still remained the need then to attempt to integrate my small-scale 
investigation of displacement and cultural adaptation of the Samal Bajau Laut with the 
study of world historical events and experiences, and to show how they linked together. 
I also felt the necessity to expand the temporal reach of analysis in order to better 
understand the response of the Sulu world and the rest of eastern Indonesia to the 
ascendance of global capitalism, modernity and the colonial state. 
Maritime trade and exchange has dominated island Southeast Asia for thousands of 
years. The peoples of the archipelago have long been locked into a web of exchange 
involving the exploitation of the rich tropical resources of the area, with producers, 
distributors and controllers involved in a complex set of relationships and structural 
dependency. Within the archipelago centres of distribution developed and, probably in 
association with the development of larger markets, capital flows and technology 
transfers in mainland Asia, trade increased and states were established in various port-
entrepots. With the growing influence of India, and later China, the trading networks 
grew in scale and complexity and the fortunes of everyone involved in exchange and 
distribution became linked with the political and economic fortunes of the mainland 
states. So trade balances and growth rates and the power of states in the archipelago 
ebbed and flowed. The late arrival of predatory Europeans in Southeast Asia disrupted 
the regional agenda and established patterns of trade, particularly the spice trade, as the 
Portuguese, the Spanish and especially the Dutch attempted to monopolise both 
commodity production and distribution that was occurring all over Southeast Asia - in 
Malacca or the environs ofMakassar, in Manila or the center of Java.4 
With the re-emergence of political stability in Xing China in the late seventeenth 
century Chinese trade flourished again. Chinese demand for exotic products, often of 
little initial interest to Europeans encouraged both the re-establishment and 'take off' of 
regional exchange networks and the production of goods. In some areas the Dutch did 
attempt to control this determined expansive trade but with limited success. In Sulawesi 
they succeeded in bullying the Makassarese and Bugis into signing trade treaties, but 
these were easily circumvented. New entrepots emerged, especially in Borneo and in the 
Sulu Sea. The latter area was particularly well placed as a no-man's land wedged 
between competing Spanish and Dutch claims and ideally suited to receive the junk trade 
3 On the method and importance of a theoretically informed practise for 'doing ethnography' and 'history' 
see John and Jean Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 
pp. 3-45; see also James Francis Warren, At the Edge of Southeast Asian History (Quezon City: New Day 
Press, 1987), pp. XIV -XVIII; 'Lives of the Ah Ku and Karayuki-san of Singapore: Sources, Method and 
Historian's Representation', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 26, No 2 (1992), pp. 1-16; 
'A Strong Stomach and Flawed Material: Towards the Making of a Trilogy, Singapore, 1870-1940' 
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No.2 (1995), pp. 245-264. 
4 On maritime trade and exchange in Southeast Asia see O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce. A Study 
of the Origins of Srivijaya (Ithaca: New York, 1967); Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State 
Development in Early Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); 'M.A.P. Meilink-
Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Commerce in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and 1630 
(Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962); J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (eds.) The Southeast Asian Port 
and Polity Rise and Demise (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990); Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia 
in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Volume I: The Lands Below the Winds (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988; Volume 2: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
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from China.5 At the same time it was within easy reach of the exotic marine and forest 
products demanded by the traders and other agents of modernity. The island of Jolo 
became a major center for cross-cultural trade in Southeast Asian history and here the 
Sulu Sultanate developed and flourished in the second half of the eighteenth century. 6 
Despite the stress Jacob Van Leur gave in the 1930s to illuminating the study of 
the region's numerous maritime traditions, few since then had looked beyond the 
European experience to the more expansive stream of Southeast Asian development.? 
The maritime populations that were dependent on the sea for their economic pursuits 
- trading, raiding, collecting and fishing - remained largely caricatures in the 
historiography of the region; their origins and development, relationships with each 
other, their loosely integrated regional political economies dominated by the institutions 
of slave raiding and cross-cultural trade, and their adjustment to external forces were 
largely written about from between 'insular blinkers'. I gradually realised, both from 
earlier personal experience and a reading of hitherto neglected historical records in 
Spain, the United States, the Philippines, the Netherlands and England, that the Sarna! 
Bajau Laut's marginalised view of Taosug or Sulu history and interpretation of past 
events, was a historical perspective from the very edge of a wide-ranging trading sphere 
that centred on the Sulu Sultanate. To be released from the conceptual constraints of 
conventional historical geography, I called this web of economic influence and 
interpersonal relations a 'Zone'. Following in the footsteps of Braudel, I abandoned the 
insular geographic perspective of earlier historians of the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Borneo, for a more dynamic definition of the Sulu Sultanate's boundaries based on larger 
scale processes of social change and a borderless history of a wide-ranging maritime 
trading network oriented toward China, Singapore and Europe. The inherent advantages 
of this theoretical approach in an upland-agricultural context were already apparent to 
me in E.R. Leach's pioneering work on the political systems of highland Burma.s In this 
5 See Leonard Blusse', 'Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the VOC', Archipel, Vol. 18, (1979). 
195-214; Strange Company- Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: 
KI1L V, 1985); Anthony Reid, 'The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping in Southeast Asia, 1567-
1842', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 27, Nos. 1 and 2 (1993) pp. 13-32; Sarasin 
Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, 1977); James Francis Warren, 'Sino-Sulu Trade in the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries', Philippine Studies, Vol. 25 (1977), pp. 50-79. 
6 See James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768-1898 The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and 
Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1981). 
7 For Jacob C. Van Leur's pioneering work on the trading world of Southeast Asia see, Indonesian Trade and 
Society Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (Hague: Van Hoeve, 1967). 
8 My initial thinking on how the late 18th century global economy and inter-regional cross-cultural trade 
created a 'borderless world' or 'zone', both geographically and historically, in the area of the Sulu and 
Celebes seas owes much to the influence of John Smail's thinking, who, in turn, had been strongly 
influenced by the hemispheric - cross-regional historical orientation of Marshall Hodgson. Templates for 
the study were provided by the seminal works of E.R. Leach and Fernand Braude!. See, E. R. Leach, 
Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study, of Kachin Social Structure (London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1954); Fernand Braude!, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age of Philip II 2 Vols. (New York: Harper and Row: 1972); A recent invitation to write a 
paper for an international symposium, 'Southeast Asia: Global Area Studies for the 21st Century', 
organised by the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, October 1996, has provided me 
with the opportunity to further elaborate my thinking on a number of key issues about writing the history of 
modern Southeast Asia. See, 'The Zulu Zone, The World Capitalist Economy and the Historical 
Imagination: Problematizing Global Cultural Interconnections and Interdependencies'. 
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context, Southeast Asia is a region in which the sea serves as the major means of 
communication for independent go-ahead states and the land forms the major 
impediment to it. It is often easier to sail considerable distances from one island to 
another, than to walk across the smallest island. Until recently dense rain forest and 
rugged mountains have provided a natural barrier behind which tribal populations have 
been able to preserve a remarkable degree of autonomy into the modern era. This 
autonomy should not mislead us though into assuming, on the one hand, a complete lack 
of contact between tribesmen and state systems, nor on the other, should extensive trade 
lead us into treating peripheral areas and states as belonging to a single, tightly integrated 
system. It.is precisely the importance of cross cultural trade in the history of the Zone, 
associated with a pattern of predatory raiding, and mobile populations which has allowed 
the complex articulation of fundamentally diverse cultural and political systems.9 
Thomas Gibson stresses that violence and commodities are truly inter-cultural 
phenomena, which can have very different meanings for neighbouring populations, 
without for all that failing to exert decisive influences on the development of each 
trading or raiding partner.IO This is a point I would like to return to shortly. Certainly, 
much of the history of 'the Sulu Zone' had to be rewritten making use of colonial 
records, ethnographic materials and comparative perspectives. I hoped these entangled 
sources, insights and approaches, especially an ethnohistorical perspective, would lead 
to a new level of historical analysis and synthesis in the study of Southeast Asian modern 
history. 
I found theorizing the Sulu Zone to provide an invaluable framework for 
thinking about complex socio-historical processes. By foregrounding the conceptual-
theoretical importance of the 'Zone', (as Braudel had done in his masterpiece on the 
Mediterranean) I was able to place the various maritime peoples - the Taosug, 
Balangingi Samal, Sarnal Bajau Laut, Iranun, and Magindanao -in their proper socio-
historical contexts and, in particular, examine and illuminate the larger ecological, 
economic and political processes of structural change in which they were embedded -
the 'big changes'- and how they helped to fashion these changes. I began to understand 
for the first time the actual process by which maritime trading states evolved and single-
mindedly expanded in Southeast Asia. By altering the spatial and temporal dimension, a 
far more comprehensive history of how a maritime 'frontier' region resisted and 
responded to the impact of global trade and western imperialism began to emerge. I had 
created a radically distinctive cultural-ecological 'framework' for re-interpreting and re-
presenting the inter-regional history of a Malayo-Muslim Sultanate situated at the edges 
of the territorial boundaries of three colonial states. My attempt to experiment with such 
a different form of framing and contextual presentation enabled me to concentrate .on the 
real historical complexities and connections to construct an autonomous angle of vision 
for interpreting Taosug society and culture in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
This 'context' was both an essential and convenient point of departure, and, metaphor, to 
9 On militarised trade diasporas see Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 158-172; and, Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) pp. 158-194. 
10 Thomas Gibson, 'Raiding, Trading and Tribal Autonomy in Insular Southeast Asia', a paper presented at 
the Conference on 'The Anthropology of War', sponsored by the Guggenheim Foundation, 24-28 March 
1986, p. 2. 
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explain complex conditions of cultural difference and diversity and processes of daily 
life and circumstance of maritime traders, marauders and fisher folk, and the nature of a 
slave system and the state and society that supported it. 
Previous historical studies of the Sulu Sultanate depended largely on published 
colonial records and travel accounts to understand the economic and social roles played 
by slaves rather than on testimonies produced by the slaves themselves. II A unique 
alternative to this Eurocentric perspective was presented by the discovery of the scattered 
statements of the fugitive captives of the Sulu Sultanate - suppressed voices from the 
past - powerful echoes of marginalised speakers and a history of silence. From over one 
hundred and eighty fugitive slave accounts, manuscript sources and travel literature clear 
patterns of social life and economic activity could be reconstituted as part of the slaves' 
own histories, and as a testimony of what they were doing to the Sulu Zone. As an 
ethnohistorical source the published and unpublished accounts of the fugitive slaves of 
the Sulu Sultanate were invaluable. The statements told me much about the 'inside' 
experience of slavery in the Sulu Zone that could never be found in more traditional 
colonial texts and sources. Indeed, without them much of the de-centering view of 
everyday life in the Sultanate would have been lost. The experience of captives from the 
moment of their seizure, and their passage in the slave prahus, to their settlement, life 
and labour in Sulu emerged from anonymity in the slave testimonies. The total effect of 
these individual lives and cases of fugitive slaves was to throw very considerable light on 
the internal processes, the ethnic and social transformations, in the Sulu zone during the 
nineteenth century.I2 
Equally important, the possibility of historians engaging in field work akin to 
anthropologists seemed to me to be an exceptionally important consideration at that time. 
And it still is now. For example, the history of the Balangingi Samal and the Sarna! 
Bajau Laut had been clouded by confused ethnic distinctions, but more by the accepted 
myth that the Samal slave raiders were forced into piracy because European trade had 
largely destroyed the Malay maritime coastal economy. Had I not had an intimate 
working knowledge of the society and history of these maritime strand communities I 
would not have been in a position to expose the myth. Having discovered the 
astronomical size of the demand for marine products destined for Chinese markets in the 
Spanish archival sources, especially tripang (sea cucumber) and mother of pearl shell, I 
was immediately aware of how much Samal Bajau Laut labour would have been required 
to procure it, and that this was far in excess of the existing population. I was not able to 
visit the Balangingi Samal in the 1830s, but I was able to 'pass over' into a Samal Bajau 
Laut coastal village of the 1960s, to observe and experience at first hand the daily life 
and subsistence of these maritime people over an extended period of time. With such 
detailed knowledge came an intuition or 'feel' for the right questions to ask about old 
legends, earlier events and ethnic stereotypes, a cultural sensitivity to what did not sound 
right in the historical record, and an exceedingly powerful image of a people called the 
'Balangingi Samal'. 
II See Cesar A. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973); 
Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism in Nineteenth 
Century Southeast Asia (Singapore: Ronald Moore, 1963); Sulu and Sabah: A Study of British Policy 
towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1978). 
12 See Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768-1898, pp. 215-251. 
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The 'History' and Argument 
J.C. Van Leur, the Dutch sociological historian, 'warned against applying European 
categories to the description of Asian social and economic phenomena'. In an 
attempting to re-interpret and re-present an 'inside view' of the Sulu Zone, I tried to 
avoid the Eurocentric, historically specific 'categories' of which Van Leur warned. The 
term 'piracy' was replaced by that of 'slave raiding', and slavery as an institution was 
defined in contrast to its western definitions. Careful examination of the inapplicability 
of certain western terminology and categories - 'piracy', 'slavery', and 'the state' -
enabled me to analyse the economic and political dynamics of a Malayo-Muslim state 
and how it was effected by global trade, and the rapid advance of western imperialism 
and modernity. I was able to amply document the explosive development of the Sulu 
Sultanate during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, a growth that was based upon a 
system of extracting forest and sea produce, by means of slave labour, for market place 
commerce with Canton. The labour was itself 'produced' by raiding the poorly defended 
populations of the Visayan Islands and Luzon and the coastal regions of eastern 
Indonesia. The social formation and prosperity of the Sulu Sultanate, as my account of 
its ethnohistory indicates, was based above all else on slaves. They were reported by 
travellers, traders and emissaries to be engaged in every conceivable domestic function, 
agricultural and industrial occupation. It was one of the primary roles of the Sulu state, 
within its larger trading zone, to maintain the material and social conditions for the 
recruitment and exploitation of slaves. 
In the section of my book on marauding I refuted ideas current in popular tradition, 
centralised colonial authority and academic circles since the late eighteenth century, that 
slave raiding was a reflection of the economic decline and moral degeneracy of Malayo-
Muslim maritime states like Sulu.13 Until recently this notion of decay, shattered 
communities and barbarism was synonomous with a specific set of social-cultural 
representations and behaviour associated with ignorance, depravity and treachery and 
connoted an islamic people in the case of the Sulu Zone who were considered to be 
savages, pirates and slavers. Instead, I argued that slave raiding was integral to state 
formation. Political power was initially built on centralised control of an entrepot; as 
the power of the Sultanate increased so the ruling elite had to ensure their monopoly of 
redistribution by forcing market trade through their port and control production, which 
was exceedingly labour intensive. Raiding helped not only to enforce redistribution, but 
also supplied labour essential for the production of commercial goods. The raiding 
groups themselves often consisted of earlier captives or their descendants. Slaves were 
often incorporated into the dominant society. New cultural identities were forged. The 
'pirates' developed some political coherence and autonomy articulated in social relations 
and political and economic practise which eventually threatened their erstwhile Taosug 
13 In these Euro-centered histories, which dwell on the activity of the lranun and Balangingi at length, the 
term "piracy" is conspicuously present in the titles: Vicente Barrantes, Guerras Piraticas de Filipinas 
contra Mindanaos y Joloanos (Madrid, 1878); Emilio Bemaldez, Resana Historica de Ia Guerra a Sur de 
Filipinas, sostenida por las armas Espanoles contra los piratas de aquel Archipielago, desde Ia conquista 
hasta nuestras dias (Madrid, 1857); Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia de Ia Pirate ria Malayo Mahometana e11 
Mindanao, Jolo y Borneo (Madrid, 1882); Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World 
(Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1963). 
28 
• 
PART I, 1996 JMBRAS VOL. 69 
masters and the Sultanate. Cross-cultural trade, raiding and slavery were all parts of the 
process of state formation in the Sulu Zone. Consequently, by the advent of the 
nineteenth century, slavery and slave raiding were fundamental to the state. The Taosug 
aristocracy depended for its prosperity on the labour of slaves and sea raiders, who fished 
for tripang, secured pearls, and manned the fleets. Marauding became the exclusive 
vocation of the Samal-speakers of Balangingi as they combined their activities with 
certain Iranun communities from the north coast of Jolo and Mindanao. The raiding 
system enabled the Sultanate. in the midst of widespread economic and social change to 
incorporate vast numbers of peoples from the Philippines and Eastern Indonesia into the 
population. From the point of view of Philippine history and the larger history of island 
Southeast Asia, it is important to understand the genesis of this particular ethnic group; 
to know that the infamous reputation Sulu acquired for slave mongering in the nineteenth 
century is attributable to the activities of the Balangingi, an 'emergent society' largely 
composed of Filipino captives and their descendants who were brought to the Sulu Zone 
and in many cases assimilated within a single generation to become the predators of their 
own people.l4 In 'closed' slave systems in mainland kingdoms such as Angkor, Pagan 
and Ayudha and among stratified tribes, such as the Toba Batak, Kenyah and Toraja, 
ethnicity was not a critical integrating concept in the enslavement process of those 
societies and cultures. 15 However, I have demonstrated that in 'open' systems such as in 
Sulu, slavery and ethnicity had become mutually reinforcing. Slavery and dependent 
labour were not solely economic institutions which enabled the late eighteenth century 
expansion of the Sulu state and domination of the regional trade network; slavery and 
the accomplishment of ethnicity had virtually become the very basis of organised society 
in the Sultanate. 
The problem of ethnic identification is an important but until recently neglected 
theme in Southeast Asian history. Historians of the region are indebted to Leach, 
Lehman, and Moerman for their pioneering work on the nature and history of upland 
societies in Southeast Asia. In Political Systems of Highland Burma, Leach 
demonstrates that culture and ethnic identity are not necessarily synonymous. He points 
out that the process of identification among tribal people like the Kachin is never simple; 
it entails migration, intermarriage, barter trade relations, warfare, inter-penetrating 
political systems, and values and beliefs shared with non-Kachin. Manifest in the work 
of all these anthropologists is a conscious effort to define the nature of social categories 
applied to ethnic groups in Southeast Asia across time. Their work has led to a more 
14 See Jim Warren, 'Who were the Balangingi Sarna!? Slave Raiding and Ethnogenesis in Nineteenth Century 
Su1u', The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No.3 (1978) pp. 477-490. 
15 Southeast Asian slavery was marked by 'closed' and 'open' kinship systems. A 'closed' system is oriented 
primarily towards retaining the labour of slaves by reinforcing their distinctiveness, as 'outsiders', from the 
dominant population. In Southeast Asia this pattern occurred primarily in wet-rice growing, labor intensive 
Indianized kingdoms and kinship-oriented stateless societies, where commercial exchange and a money 
economy had made little impact. In Southeast Asian societies where various forms of dependent labour 
were common, individuals did not emphasize the route taken to 'slavery' unless this corresponded with the 
critically important legal-social distinction in 'open' and 'closed systems between being an 'insider' or 
'outsider'. See James L Watson (ed.), Asian and African Systems of Slavery (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980) pp. 6-7, 9-13; Anthony Reid (ed.) Slavery Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1983) pp. 156-181. 
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complete understanding of the nature of ethnic groups and the processes responsible for 
"accomplishing ethnicity" among upland peoples in Southeast Asia.J6 
These studies reveal more of the Southeast Asian past than was thought possible a 
generation ago, but our understanding of the development of the present extraordinary 
ethnic diversity of insular Southeast Asia still remains far from perfect. Historians of 
island Southeast Asia in particular have been generally inclined to accept "ethnicity" as a 
fixed premise. Such formulation has hindered necessary reappraisal of available 
evidence on the nature and history of particular "societies". An outstanding example of 
this is the case of the Balangingi Samal, a little-known but important population group in 
the nineteenth-century island world. Before the beginning of that century, the 
Balangingi Samal did not exist. Yet by the 1830s, Balangingi Samal slave-raiding 
activities, which were an important component of the wider island economy of the Sulu 
Sultanate, had made them a group renowned and feared throughout Southeast Asia. 17 
Slave raiding, or what the Spanish, Dutch and British called piracy, was no longer a 
manifestation of decay and dependence but rather the result of phenomenal economic 
growth and strength. It was part of a vital effort to partake in and control a rapidly 
increasing volume of commerce caused by the advent of the Europeans in the China 
trade in the late eighteenth century. 
Not surprisingly, debt bondage as an economic institution was most fully 
developed in Southeast Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century as global trade 
and monetisation affected local social systems and regional trade networks, and because 
the very survival of slavery in different parts of Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in the 
world, was being called into question. The main slave raiding zones in the South China 
sea and the waters of Eastern Indonesia and the Philippines attracted the intense naval 
pressure of Britain, Spain and the Netherlands for more than a quarter of a century; by 
the 1880s, the number of slaves moving across the region had been reduced to a trickle. 
The abolition of slave traffic in Southeast Asia was a mortal blow to the economies of 
states like Sulu. When aristocratic Taosug in Sulu and others could no longer rely on 
long distance maritime raids to supply sufficient numbers of slaves for their needs, the 
amount of tribute ordinarily collected from dependents increased dramatically, and fines 
in the various local legal codes became far more prohibitive. Traditional states 
16 See E.R. Leach, The Political Systems of Highland Burma (London: London School of Economics, 1954) 
and 'The Frontiers of Burma', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Ill, l (1960), pp. 49-68; F.K. 
Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society (Urbana: University of lllinois Press, Studies of Anthropology, No. 
3, 1963) and 'Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems' in Southeast Asian Tribes, 
Mino.rities and Nations, ed. P. Kunstadter, l (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); pp. 93-124; M. 
Moerman, 'Who Are the Lue?', American Anthropologist, LXVH (1965), pp. 1215-230 and 
'Accomplishing Ethnicity' in Ethnomethodology, ed. R. Turner (London: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 54-68. 
For general articles relating to the genesis and persistence of ethnic boundaries, the incorporation of ethnic 
groups, and the organization of interethnic relations in polyethnic social systems, see Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries, ed. F. Barth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), and Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural 
Societies, ed. L.A. Despres (the Hague: Mouton, 1975). 
17 Margarita De Los Reyes Cojuangco has attempted to reconstruct the history of the Samal Balangingi 
diaspora spanning four generations of exiles in the aftermath of the decisive battle of Balangingi in 1848. 
Particularly valuable is the biographical sketch of Panglina Taupan, the revered and feared Samal 
Balangingi leader, which is set out in a total context and carefully analysed for its historical and cultural 
meaning. See Margarita De Los Reyes Cojuangco, Kris of Valor The Sarna! Balangingi Defiance and 
Diaspora (Manila: Manison Press, 1993). 
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recognised, with able bodied replacements becoming scarce, that they derived their 
greatest advantage from extending various systems of bondage and dependent labour. 
The bonded could be given away as gifts, donations, tribute, security for a loan, sold or 
inherited. Indeed, forced sales into 'slavery' and bondage to ensure survival rose in the 
second half of the nineteenth century as the autonomy of traditional states and slave 
raiding both declined under the combined pressure of modern colonial navies. 
Interestingly, in terms of social values and everyday life, anthropological investigations 
of the heritage of 'slaves' from the nineteenth century onward, conclude that descendants 
of ex-bondsmen and other marginalised peoples are still suffering from the effects of 
centuries of bondage in various parts of Southeast Asia. By tracing the changing global, 
regional and local trade patterns of the Sulu Sultanate, the interaction between the 
Sultanate and powerful colonial powers, the rivalry between the Sultanate and the 
neighbouring Sultanates of Brunei and Mindanao, and finally the relationship of slave 
raiding and slavery to these phenomena and events conclusions were reached on three 
basic issues: first, the causality of seasonal long-distance maritime raiding; second, the 
causality of general social transformation; and finally, the process of accomplishing 
ethnicity, of which an accurate understanding required a diachronic, ecological 
perspective. 
Raiding, Trading and Tribal Autonomy 
Let me return now for a brief moment to Highland Southeast Asia. In The Sulu Zone, I 
stressed that domination involved control over the productive and reproductive power of 
human beings rather than over land as in Europe. The manipulation of ethnically diverse 
groups was crucial in this process. I compared the shifts of ethnic diversity in island 
Southeast Asia with the persistence of ethnic distinctiveness in parts of mainland 
Southeast Asia. But the mainland groups, situated predominantly in the highland areas, 
have developed and elaborated ethnic distinctiveness in response to very different forces. 
Ethnic diversity is in part a response to the homogenising advances of lowland states, 
which, unlike their island counterparts, could often enforce their power within their 
domains. The highlands tribal peoples resisted incorporation into the larger traditions of 
lowland modernising states by rejecting cultural assimilation through ethnic 
differentiation and by deliberately living on the edge of the periphery of these states. IS 
The island states, like Sulu, could not assimilate a wide variety of societies beyond the 
boundaries of their own trading ports and the client ethnic groups which did emerge 
across the Zone from the steam roller expansion of cross-cultural market place 
commerce and slave raiding, maintained their independence and cultural distinctiveness. 
However, with respect to the development of ethnic inter-relations, indigenous markets 
and regional commerce, it must also be appreciated that marauding and cross-cultural 
trade were not always maritime-coastal. Slave raiding also extended over land in the 
interiors of the large islands of Borneo, Sulawesi and Luzon. In this context slave 
raiding and warfare provides insights into the pioneering migrations, life ways and world 
views of vigorous proud tribal peoples, who were slash-burn agriculturalists and ardent 
18 See Victor Lieberman, 'An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia? Problems of Regional Coherence -A 
Review Article', The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3 (1995) pp. 796-807. 
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head-hunters, like the Kenyah, Toraja and Igorot. Violent raiding, coerced trade for 
jungle products and debt bondage are all problematic areas with respect to tribal 
autonomy to which some sort of response is required by their insertion in the regional 
global political economy. Historically, tribal groups which failed to develop appropriate 
responses and ideologies were either absorbed into lowland states or eliminated. There 
remains an urgent need to understand and theorise the interaction of highland and tribal 
societies with autonomous ideologies and value systems in common regional economies, 
who are facing the onslaught of modernity.J9 
Conclusion 
In a very real sense, I questioned the boundedness of universes of cultural meaning in 
The Sulu Zone. Critiques of the traditional anthropological/ historical view of the non-
western world as composed of discrete, bounded, 'organic societies' each governed by 
its own integrated 'culture', have come partly from scholars such as Wolf, Friedman and 
Tsing examining the world system in terms of historical political economy, cultural 
studies and feminism.2o As Roger Keesing has noted, the picture being opened up by 
modern archeology, ethnohistory and world systems theory is of regional systems with 
highly permeable boundaries between language groups. The 'tribes' of Africa and 
ethno-linguistic groups of mainland and insular Southeast Asia seem to have been fluid, 
with regional trade systems, a flow of objects, commodities and ideas, and unstable and 
contextually shifting boundaries.2I According to Clifford Geertz, such peoples were in 
fact 'products' of large scale processes of global social change which had made them 
what they were and continued to make them what they would become in reaction to the 
uncontrollable and rapid impact of these forces.22 Interpenetrating political and ritual 
structures and processes, cross-cutting allegiances and situationally crystallised 
identities transcended the margins of societies. Cross-cultural trade and later colonial-
capitalism and modernity, drastically transformed 'cultural' boundaries, with colonial 
states freezing this dynamic process of flux into stable administrative units and 
disrupting or destroying old regional systems of trade, ritual and politics. 
Future research trends should take account of both the extension of colonial 
capitalism and shifts in the international economy that made the slave trade and the 
accomplishment of ethnicity the heart of the political economy of particular states and 
19 See, Thomas Gibson, 'Raiding, Trading and Tribal Autonomy in Insular Southeast Asia', paper presented 
at the conference on 'The Anthropology of War', sponsored by the Guggenheim Foundation, 24·28 March, 
1986; Christopher Healy, 'Tribes and States In "Pre-Colonial" Borneo: Structural Contradictions and the 
Generation of Piracy', Social Analysis, No. 18 (1985), pp. 3-39; Robert L. Winzeler, 'Ecology, Culture, 
Social Organisation, and State Formation in Southeast Asia', Current Anthropology, Vol. 17, No.4 (1976) 
pp. 623-640. 
20 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); 
Jonathan Friedman, "Tribes, States and Transformation' in Maurice Bloch (ed.) Marxist Analysis and 
Social Anthropology (Association of Social Anthropologist, Studies No.2. London: Malaby Press, 1975) 
pp. 161-202; System, Structure and Contradiction: The Evolution of 'Asiatic' Social Formations (Social 
Studies in Oceania and Southeast Asia, No. 2. Copenhagen: The National Museum of Denmark, 1979); 
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen Marginality in an Out-of-the-way Place 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
21 Roger M. Keesing 'Asian Cultures?' Asian Studies Review. Vol. 15, No.2 (1991), pp. 43-50. 
22 See Clifford Geertz's review of Tsing's book, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen. 'Life on the Edge', The 
New York Review, April4, 1994, pp. 3-4. 
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colonial cities from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, virtually 
nothing is known about where the slaves came from in Southeast Asia, nor how, for 
example the trade of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries differed from earlier 
centuries. There are also few rounded portraits of life within the interstices of particular 
slave cultures and marginal societies. Whereas, the final decades of the nineteenth 
century offer an important field of work on links between abolition and emancipation, 
the rise of peasant and plantation forms of monoculture, and forced and contract labour, 
as a dominant productive system in colonial and post-colonial Southeast Asia . 
. In conclusion then the implications of my analysis of the Sulu Zone perhaps, could 
be applied in a wider framework not only to elucidate the development of states and the 
elaboration of ethnic diversity in insular Southeast Asia, but also to develop a 
comparative framework with mainland states and cultures. The implications of such 
analysis could also be applied to a wider time frame, as my model and method could 
possibly be used to reconsider the earlier history and even pre-history of the island 
world. In the end, perhaps, such comparisons and concepts could challenge many of the 
accepted models of the origin of the state, dependent as they are on examples drawn 
from mainland cultures where control over ethnic groups and boundaries - the forces of 
production - were much more profound than they were in the Sulu Zone, or other parts 
of island Southeast Asia. 
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